NEURAL MECHANISMS ONLINE

24 January 2020
15-17 Greenwhich Mean Time
**(check your local time here)**

Frances EGAN

(Rutgers University)

The role of Representation in Computational Cognitive Models

Abstract

Much of cognitive neuroscience construes cognitive capacities as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the world. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the widespread use of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. Is representational talk to be taken literally? Is it just a useful fiction? In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in computational cognitive models that rejects both of these views. I call it a deflationary account.

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10 January, Manolo MARTINEZ [WEBINAR]

12/30/2019

10 January 2020
15-17 Greenwhich Mean Time
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Manolo MARTINEZ

(University of Barcelona, Spain)

Information Theory is a Formal Theory of Representation

Abstract

Information theory is a formal theory of representation. All signals in an information-processing pipeline are, in a minimal sense, representations. Core cases of representation are those for which, furthermore, a description in information-theoretic terms is particularly illuminating---that is, those that undergo substantial source- or channel-coding.

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12 July, Beate KRICKEL & Matej KOHAR [WEBINAR]

7/4/2019

12 July 2019
15-17 - Greenwhich Mean Time
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Beate KRICKEL & Matej KOHAR

(Ruhr University Bochum)

Compare and Contrast:
how to assess the completeness of mechanistic explanation

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Abstract

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (2018) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges.

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28 June, Carlotta PAVESE [WEBINAR]

6/25/2019

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Rescheduled on 20 December
15-17 - Greenwhich Mean Time
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Carlotta PAVESE

(Cornell University)

The Psychological Reality of Practical Representation

Abstract

We represent the world in a variety of ways: through percepts, concepts, propositional attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic paintings, etc. Some of these representations are mental. It is customary for philosophers to distinguish two main kinds of mental representations: perceptual representation (e.g., vision, auditory, tactile) and conceptual representation. This essay presupposes a version of this dichotomy and explores the way in which a further kind of representation – procedural representation – represents. It is argued that, in some important respects, procedural representations represent differently from both purely conceptual representations and purely perceptual representations. Although procedural representations, just like conceptual and perceptual representations, involve modes of presentation, their modes of presentation are distinctively practical, in a sense which I will clarify. It is argued that an understanding of this sort of practical representation has important consequences for the debate on the nature of know-how.

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14 June, Dan WEISKOPF [WEBINAR]

6/6/2019

14 June 2019

exceptionally at h 14-16 - Greenwhich Mean Time
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Dan WEISKOPF

(Georgia State University)

Data Mining the Brain to Decode the Mind